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ters 4 and 5, I single out the one against logical determinism, or fatalism.
The topic has been much written about, often enough in terms of
Aristotle's famous discussion of "the sea battle tomorrow" in De
Illterpretatione, which is also Felt's point of departure (pp. 41-42). He
brings this difficult matter as close to his readers as it can be brought in
so short a book: there are many concrete examples, and they are happily
woven into the argument. The argument itself turns on (a) four assertions about truth and the future (pp. 43, 47, 49, 53) and (b) three principles of being and becoming (pp. 56-57).
The positive-as distinct from critical-part of Felt's book is a doctrine of causality designed to show that the agent's freedom consists in
an exercise of causality rather than in the absence of causality (chaps. 6,
7, 9). The three principles just mentioned are central to that doctrine, so I
give here the simplified version of them Felt gives in chapter 9: "(A) The
past is definite and settled .... (B) The present creates the definiteness of new set-

tled actuality out of a width of possibility for incorporating the past .... (C)
Only the activity of real agents creates the definiteness of settled actuality" (pp.
101-2). Felt's use of the principles depends upon the distinction he
makes, in chapter 6, between subject-time, the time experienced by
agents, and object-time, the time of the physicist. This chapter owes
something to St. Augustine and something to Bergson. The free causality
of agency, Felt says, has the same temporal structure as that of lived
time, or subject-time: it "takes time but is not itself temporally divisible"
(p. 84). What Felt calls subject-time I prefer to call act-temporality and to
insist on a metaphorical applicability of such temporality to the causality
operative in nature in general. I do not think Felt would disagree with
that, but the expression 'subject-time' suggests a more radical cleft
between the causality of agents and the causality of the rest of nature
than I think he has in mind. But this is perhaps no more than a terminological disagreement. As one who has argued, over many years, that if
we are to understand human nature we must develop a more ample
doctrine of causality, one in which human action itself is exemplary, I
welcome the appearance of this compact and accessible book. An earlier
version of chapter 8, "Becoming, Freedom, and the Problem of Evil,"
appeared in this journal (I [1984], 370-77).

The Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control, by John Martin Fischer.
Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1994. Pp ix and 273. $21.95.
TED A. WARFIELD, University of Notre Dame
John Fischer has been an active participant in discussions of freedom,
determinism, foreknowledge, and moral responsibility for nearly two
decades. Fischer's articles and anthologies on freedom and determinism, freedom and foreknowledge, and moral responsibility are a tremendous resource to philosophers working on these topics. In this wideranging and clearly written book, Fischer adds to this already impres-
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sive body of work. The book is essential reading to philosophers working on any aspect of free will or moral responsibility.
I cannot hope to discuss every topic covered in Fischer's book, so I
will discuss what I take to be some of its more problematic features
beginning with Fischer's original and important discussion of moral
responsibility.
Many philosophers have worried that determinism, if true, threatens
moral responsibility. Here is one way of articulating this worry.
Determinism seems to imply that if S does A, then there were no alternative possibilities open to S, and it is plausible to think that S is morally
responsible for doing A only if there were alternative possibilities open
to S. So it is plausible to think that determinism is incompatible with
moral responsibility.
In his well-known paper" Alternative Possibilities and Moral
Responsibility," Harry Frankfurt challenged the claim that alternative
possibilities are necessary for moral responsibility.\.. Here is one Frankfurt
style case. Jill decides on her own to steal a book from the library and she
does so knowing full well that stealing is wrong. Unbeknownst to Jill,
had she shown any inclination at all to refrain from stealing the book,
Jack would have intervened and forced her (employing a credible threat
to her life) to steal the book. But Jack did not force Jill's hand; Jill stole
the book on her own. Many have thought that cases like this are cases of
moral responsibility without alternative possibilities.
One response to Frankfurt cases is what Fischer calls the "flicker of
freedom" response. This response accepts that agents in Frankfurt cases
are morally responsible but denies that there are no alternative possibilities in the cases. For example, the flicker strategist might claim that
though Jill is morally responsible for her actions, it was open to Jill to
decide not to steal the book. Of course, had Jill done this, Jack would
have forced her to steal the book. The point, though, is that this alternative possible course of events represents a genuine alternative possibility
to the actual series of events. So, according to the flicker theorist, the
Jack / Jill case is not a counterexample to the claim that alternative possibilities are necessary for moral responsibility.2
Fischer enters the debate at this point with an interesting suggestion:
"I am willing to grant to the flicker theorist the claim that there exists an
alternative possibility here; but my basic worry is that this alternative
possibility is not sufficiently robust to ground the relevant attributions of
moral responsibility." (140) Fischer's claim is interesting and potentially
important to discussions of the nature of moral responsibility. But in the
present context, as I will explain, it is hard to see why Fischer even
thinks that this claim is relevant.
After some discussion of the claim quoted above, Fischer notes that
he sees no reason to accept that it is in virtue of the alternative possibilities present in Frankfurt cases (or other conditions necessary for the
presence of the alternative possibilities) that agents in Frankfurt cases
are morally responsible. Fischer then declares that we have reached a
"Dialectical Stalemate" -a situation "common in philosophy" in which
one side (Frankfurt's, according to Fischer) has fallen "just short" of
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establishing its position and it is hard to see how further non-question
begging progress can be made.
Whatever one thinks of Fischer's metaphilosophical views, I think
Fischer is wrong to claim that the present debate, at least as he presents
it, has reached a Dialectical Stalemate. Frankfurt hoped to show that
even if determinism rules out alternative possibilities, this does not automatically rule out moral responsibility. And Frankfurt, at least as portrayed by Fischer, hoped to show this by providing counterexamples to
the claim that moral responsibility requires alternative possibilities. On
Fischer's diagnosis, flicker theorists show that Frankfurt cases involve
alternative possibilities and so are not successful counterexamples. I see
no stalemate here; if Fischer's analysis is correct, the flicker theorists
have decisively won this debate.
Fischer seems to think that rebutting Frankfurt is not enough for the
flicker theorists:
"[I]t is not enough for the flicker theorist ... to identify an alternative
possibility. Although this is surely a first step, it is not enough to establish the flicker of freedom view, because what needs also to be shown is
that these alternative possibilities ... ground our attributions of moral
responsibility." (140) But the flicker of freedom response is nothing more
than a response to Frankfurt. One wanting to respond to Frankfurt
needn't go on to do any of the things Fischer claims the flicker theorist
must. So while Fischer's claims and arguments about what grounds
moral responsibility are interesting and potentially important, it is misguided to think that these claims support Frankfurt.
Let me now tum to one puzzling part of Fischer's discussion of arguments for the incompatibility of free will and determinism. Such arguments typically employ what Fischer calls a transfer principle. One
plausible transfer principle states that "If S has no choice about P, and Q
is a logical consequence of P, then S has no choice about Q." Fischer
wonders if plausible incompatibilist arguments must employ a transfer
principle. Fischer argues that this is not the case by formulating an
incompatibilist argument that does not explicitly rely on a transfer principle and then challenging incompatibilists to show that the argument
somehow implicitly relies on one.
Unfortunately for Fischer, an incompatibilist needn't respond in this
way, for Fischer presents a formally invalid argument and therefore does
not offer a plausible non-transfer incompatibilist argument. Fischer admits,
in a note, that his argument is invalid but says that nonetheless he
"believe[s] that it is reasonable to accept its conclusion, given both its formal
structure and the content of its premises" (228). I can make no sense of this
claim.3 .If Fischer wishes to argue that incompatibilists needn't rely on any
transfer principle, he would be well advised to offer a formally valid incompatibilist argument as evidence of this (the issue of whether the argument
somehow presupposes a transfer principle would of course remain).
Fischer's admission that this central argument of Chapter Three is
invalid is not the only case in which Fischer's notes seem to reveal that
Fischer is aware of important difficulties for his central claims. I will
briefly mention two further examples of this.
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In Chapter Eight, Fischer begins to develop a sophisticated and novel
account of moral responsibility. The punch line of Fischer's analysis is
that weak reasons-responsiveness is sufficient for moral responsibility,
where an action is weakly reasons-responsive just in case there exists a
"possible world in which there is a sufficient reason to do otherwise, the
agent's actual mechanism operates, and the agent does otherwise" (166).
In note 8, however, Fischer admits that this account incorrectly implies
that an insane killer whose mechanism is responsive only to bizarre (yet
sufficient) reasons for not killing is morally responsible. Fischer admits
that his account is refuted by the counterexample but says little more
than that the account "needs to be refined" and that he does "not think
the revision will be radical"(243).4
Similarly disappointing is Fischer's choice of opponents in Chapter
Two which assesses two challenges to incompatibilist transfer principles. Fischer discusses only weak challenges from Michael Slote and
Anthony Kenny, neither of which directly addresses the critical transfer
principles for power necessity. Fischer is well aware, as evidenced by
note 31 of the chapter, of more serious challenges to incompatibilist
transfer principles from philosophers including David Widerker, Linda
Zagzebski, and Kadri Vihvelin, but he does not discuss this important
body of literature.
Before concluding, I should say something to readers of this journal
who may be primarily or exclusively interested in the issue of human
freedom and divine foreknowledge. The focus of this book is on causal
determinism, so while Fischer certainly devotes a healthy number of
pages to discussing the foreknowledge debate, most are spent developing parallels between foreknowledge and causal determinism. Not
much space is devoted to the special intricacies of the foreknowledge
debate, the exception being Fischer's helpful discussion of hard and soft
facts which makes several original points and includes a response to
critics of further inquiry into the nature of this extremely complex distinction. Readers interested exclusively in the foreknowledge problem
can certainly skip several chapters of Fischer's book, but cannot afford to
ignore the entire book.
Let me close by stressing that I have focused on what I take to be
some of the weaknesses of Fischer's fine book. On the whole the book is
closely argued, well written and is mandatory reading for metaphysicians concerned with the will. 5
NOTES

1. Journal of Philosophy 66 (December 1969), 829-839.
2. A second reading of Frankfurt style cases is that they are counterexamples to the claim that morally responsibility for P requires alternative possibilities to P. On this reading, the Frankfurtian would claim that though
there are alternative possibilities present in the Jack / Jill case, Jill is responsible for stealing the book even though there were no open alternative possibilities to her doing so. This suggests that even if determinism rules out
alternative possibilities to the actions one performs, one might still be moral-
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ly responsible for the actions. The standard anti-Frankfurtian reply is to
deny that Jill is responsible for stealing the book and instead claim that she
is responsible for stealing it on her own and that there were open alternatives
to this action.
3. Professor Fischer informs me that he explains and defends his claim
further in "Free Will and the Modal Principle," Philosophical Studies, forthcoming.
4. In Responsibility and Freedom: An Essay on Control, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 1996) Fischer and Mark Ravizza
discuss and defend this account of moral responsibility.
5. Thanks to Peter van Inwagen, Tim O'Connor, Chris Hill, Alicia Finch
and Gordon Pettit for helpful discussion of Fischer's book.

Is Christianity True?, by Hugo A. Meynell. Washington, DC, The Catholic
University of America Press, 1994. Pp.ix and 149. $24.95 (Cloth); $14.95
(Paper).
DAVID B. BURRELL, C.s.c., University of Notre Dame
The author exhibits his skill in issues connected with philosophy of religion to test out a clear intention: "that the Christian has good reason for
believing what she characteristically believes"(I). He is not directly concerned with "what is for many people the crucial issue, belief that there is
a God"(2), because he had already dealt with that issue in a book published in 1982: The Intelligible Universe. The topics he covers, in order, are
(1) the sufficiency (or not) of secular morality, (2) other religions, (3)
incarnation and atonement, (4) historical criticism of the bible, (5) divine
triunity, and (6) "life after death." I mention these topics since the argument of the book is inevitably topical and at root rhetorical, since criteria
for "good reasons" are notoriously difficult to delineate. He does want to
undertake the task, however, rather than rest with accepting belief in
God as "properly basic," since he does not accept counsels of despair
regarding ways of determining "which beliefs are rational"(3), or at least
more rational than others. Indeed, he contends "that the most cogent reason for believing in the existence of a God is the openness of the universe
to investigation by the human mind"(3)-the burden of the earlier book.
But finding reasons for believing in a God, and finding commensurate reasons for believing what Christians believe are two quite distinct
endeavors. And the latter, which organizes this work, is of necessity
even more diffuse and rhetorical in character than the first. For one
thing, what are to count as "good reasons" seem quite contingent, and
hence nearly totally dependent on the attractiveness of the presentation
to someone for whom the journey of faith may not previously have been
an option. Nor is there a canonical set of topics available, which
accounts for the diversity of approach which such endeavors might take.
Meynell's approach will probably strike most readers as "old-fashioned," both in the topics proposed and the manner of dealing with
them. The most arresting chapter in the book (to this reviewer) was the

